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Doubling the Price of Past Discrimination: The
Employer's Burden After McDonald v. Santa Fe
Trail TransportationCo.
SHELLEY J. VENICK*
RONALD A. LANE**
Affording employment opportunity in the private sector to minorities has come to be viewed as an important tool in achieving national social policies. Title VII and other legislative and administrative programs have been popularly viewed as vehicles to integrate
the nation's work force. To some, these programs are seen as attempts to require employers to take preferential, "affirmative action" to promote positively the employment opportunities of minorities,' and so eradicate the vestiges of a past discriminatory system.
To others, such positive action is really "reverse discrimination"'
abridging the civil rights of non-minority persons. The recent Supreme Court decision in McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co.,3 gave recognition and credence to the position that nonminorities have the same civil rights as those persons traditionally
the victims of unlawful discrimination. This decision, however,
brings into focus the incompatibility of equal employment opportunity for all persons with any attempt to eliminate the present
effects of past discriminmi on. This article will first explore the history of reverse discrimination, analyze the McDonald case, and then
examine the dilemma of employers today faced with competing
pressures to act without discrimination and yet take affirmative
action on behalf of minorities.
HISTORY OF REVERSE DISCRIMINATION CASES

The integration of minorities and females into the work force has
been generally considered a matter of national priority since the
*

Attorney with the Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway System. B.A., Indiana Univer-

sity, 1971; J.D., Ohio State University College of Law, 1974.
** Attorney with the Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway System. A.B., Miami University, 1972; J.D., Northwestern University School of Law, 1975.
1. As used in this article, the term "minorities" includes women as well as groups traditionally viewed as such. Sometimes for convenience "blacks" will be compared with "whites"
but the analysis is not intended to be limited to the context of racial discrimination.
2. "Reverse discrimination," as used herein, refers to discriminatory treatment of the
traditional majority classes, i.e., whites and males.
3. 427 U.S. 273 (1976).
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early 1960's. To effectuate this goal, the federal government,4 and
some state and local governments,5 have encouraged employers to
take "affirmative action" to promote utilization of minorities and
females at all levels within their work force. As this concern over
minority and female employment grew, however, a parallel concern
was created in individual white workers about their relative employment status.
Realization by whites that the special emphasis placed on
recruitment, hiring, and promotion of blacks and females would
operate to their disadvantage was not sudden. Over the past decade,
there have been scattered challenges by aggrieved white employees
4. See Exec. Order No. 11246, (1965), codified in 3 C.F.R. § 169 (1974). See also implementing regulations issued by the United States Department of Labor, Office of Federal
Contract Compliance, at 41 C.F.R. § 60-1.1 et seq. See generally Note, Federal Contract
Compliance: Use of Special ContractProvisions to EncourageMinority Employment, 8 Loy.
Cm. L.J. 913 (1977).
5. See, e.g., Alaska Governor's Code of Fair Practices for State Agencies, Art. II(a), FAIR
EMPL. PRAC. MAN. (BNA) 451:85, 86 (affirmative action required of state contractors); Arizona Exec. Order of Affirmative Action, FAIR EMPL. PRAC. MAN. (BNA) 451:121 (establishes
state office of affirmative action to formulate and oversee affirmative action plans and policies); California Code of Fair Practices, FAIR EMPL. PRAc. MAN. (BNA) 451:132b (affirmative
action required of government contractors); CoLo. REv. STAT. § 80-21-7 (12) (1975) (Civil
Rights Commission authorized to order affirmative action to remedy prior discrimination);
Georgia Exec. Order (July 29, 1976), FAIR EMPL. PRAC. MAN. (BNA) 451:281 (establishes state
affirmative action plan); ILL. RaV. STAT. ch. 48, § 858.01(c) (1975) (fair employment practices
commission may order affirmative action to remedy past discrimination); Rules of Illinois
Fair Employment Practices Commission § 6.1, FAIR EMPL. PRAc. MAN. (BNA) 451:343 (requiring affirmative action of state contractors); ME. REv. STAT. tit. 5, § 65-781 (1975) (affirmative
action in state employment required); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 151B, § 5 (1976) (fair
employment practices commission may order affirmative action to remedy past discrimination); Philadelphia Ordinance No. 2256 (June 10, 1963), FAIR EMPL. PRAC. MAN. (BNA) 451:
2457-58 (city commission on human relations may order affirmative action to remedy past
discrimination); Exec. Order of Mayor of Pittsburgh (Nov. 1, 1968), FAIR EMPL. PRAC. MAN.
(BNA) 451:2561 (requiring affirmative action of city contractors); Regulation for Affirmative
Action Compliance Programs to End Sex-Based Discrimination (New York City, Feb. 1, 1972)
(requiring affirmative action plan with respect to sex discrimination in city contracts).
At least one statute, however, seeks to limit the affirmative action requirement:
Nothing contained in this chapter or in any rule or regulation issued by the
commission shall be interpreted as requiring any employer, employment agency or
labor organization to grant preferential treatment to any individual or to any group
because of the race, color, religious creed, national origin, sex, age or ancestry of
such individual or group because of imbalance which may exist between the total
number of percentage of persons employed by any employer, referred or classified
for employment by any employment agency or labor organization admitted to
membership or classified by any labor organization or admitted to or employed in,
any apprenticeship or other training program, and the total number of percentage
of persons of such race, color, religious creed, national origin, sex, age or ancestry
in the Commonwealth or in any community, section or other area therein, or in the
available work force in the Commonwealth or in any of its political subdivisions.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 151B, § 4 (1976).
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to the integration efforts of their employers. Invoking federal civil
rights legislation,7 few of these challenges have elicited either judicial sympathy or substantial relief.8 Since 1973, however, there has
been an increasing awareness of the dilemma posed by affording
remedial relief to minority workers and imposing priorities in their
hiring at the expense of the white, male incumbent worker or applicant
6. See cases cited at note 8 infra.
7. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 protects private employees from discrimination
in employment based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-h,
(1970), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-h (Supp. IV 1974) [hereinafter cited as Title VIII.
Section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 provides that all persons within the United States
enjoy the "full and equal benefits of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and
property as is enjoyed by white citizens ....
" 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970). White plaintiffs had
attempted to invoke the protection of § 1981 in private employment discrimination actions
for a number of years with minimal success. However, the Supreme Court has expressly
extended the reach of § 1981 to white persons in McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Trans. Co.,
427 U.S. 273, 286-96 (1976). For detailed discussion of whites' right to sue under § 1981, see
Schoenberger, A Prolegomenato Reviving the Civil Rights Act of 1866: White Standing Under
Section 1981-A Federal Common Law Right to Contract, 8 Loy. CHI. L.J. 81 (1976); Note,
The Expanding Scope of Section 1981: Assault of Private Discrimination and a Cloud on
Affirmative Action, 90 HARv. L. Rv. 412, 440-52 (1976). For an examination of the interplay
between these two statutory remedies see Comment, Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981: Two
Independent Solutions, 10 U. RICH. L. REv. 339 (1976).
8. See, e.g., Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1040
(1972) (class action under § 1981 by fire department employees in which the Eighth Circuit
remanded and sanctioned temporary hiring quota of one minority person for every two nonminority persons); Rios v. Steamfitters, Local 638, 501 F.2d 622 (2d Cir. 1974) (action under
§ 1981 and Title VII by union applicants in which the Second Circuit upheld a quota for union
membership); Patterson v. Newspaper Deliverers' Union, 384 F. Supp. 585 (S.D.N.Y. 1974),
aff'd, 514 F.2d 767 (2d Cir. 1975) (consolidated actions under Title VII by newspaper and
publications delivery employees in which the Second Circuit approved a settlement which
provided for aggressive affirmative action and a 25% minority employment goal); O'Burn v.
Shapp, 70 F.R.D. 1029 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (private action under Title VII by police department
applicants in which the district court refused to allow collateral attack on a consent decree
which allegedly caused reverse discrimination). For collections of the cases which have addressed the appropriateness and scope of preferential relief, see 1974-75 Annual Survey of
Labor Relations and Employment Discrimination Law, 16 B.C. InD. & COM. L. Rxv. 965,
1068-73 (1975); Comment, The Myth of Reverse Racial Discrimination: An Historical
Perspective, 23 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 319 (1974).
9. One case which brought analogous issues to national attention was DeFunis v.
Odegaard, 82 Wash. 2d 11, 507 P.2d 1169 (1973), vacated per curiam as moot, 416 U.S. 312
(1974). DeFunis involved a white male whose application for admission to the University of
Washington School of Law was rejected pursuant to an admissions procedure which, while
not employing quotas, did consider the race and ethnic background of applicants who chose
to indicate those characteristics on the application form. Mr. De Funis filed suit charging,
inter alia, that his fourteenth amendment equal protection rights had been violated when the
school accepted 36 minority applicants whose past scholastic performance indicated that they
were less qualified than plaintiff. The Washington Supreme Court rejected the trial court's
ruling that consideration of race by the school was per se unconstitutional. Instead, the court
required the defendant to prove that consideration of the race of its applcants was "necessary
to the accomplishment of a compelling state interest." 82 Wash. 2d 33, 507 P.2d at 1182.

792

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 8

Preferential relief was first challenged when courts imposed hiring
and promotion quotas to remedy past discriminatory practices of a
particular employer. Despite pleas on behalf of affected white incumbent employees, such quota relief has been approved by many
federal courts. 0 The imposition of such remedial measures was
based on the rationale that only by such definitive quotas could
clear-cut patterns of past discrimination be corrected. Finding
themselves unable to fashion other forms of adequate relief, the
courts relied upon the quota system as a remedy."
While the authority of a federal court to order preferential hiring
has been widely accepted, there has been no unanimity as to when
such a remedy is appropriate. In Carter v. Gallagher,2 the Eighth
Circuit expressed its hesitation with respect to the imposition of
absolute quotas, saying:
The absolute preference ordered by the trial court would operate
as a present infringement on those non-minority group persons who
are equally or superiorly qualified for the fire fighter's positions;
and we hesitate to advocate implementation 13of one constitutional
guarantee by the outright denial of another.
Similarly, the Third Circuit has expressed its concern over preferential treatment:
Opening the doors long shut to minorities is imperative, but in so
doing, we must be careful not to close them on the face of others,
lest we abandon the basic principle of non-discrimination that
sparked efforts to pry open those doors in the first place."
Compelling interests were found in the state's desire to: (1) promote integration; (2) produce
a racially balanced law school student body; and (3) correct the shortage of minority members
admitted to the bar. The school's consideration of racial characteristics was found to be
necessary since less restrictive alternatives such as improving primary and secondary education in the state would not be able to correct the problem of underrepresentation in the
foreseeable future. However, by the time plaintiff's case was argued in the United States
Supreme Court he had already been admitted to the law school pursuant to the trial court's
order, and had, in fact, registered for his final semester. Accordingly, the suit was dismissed
as moot by the Supreme Court. 416 U.S. at 317. See also cases cited at notes 12 and 14 infra.
10. See Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir. 1972); Commonwealth v. O'Neill, 4
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1286 (3d Cir. 1972).
11. Commonwealth v. O'Neill, 473 F.2d 1029 (3d Cir. 1973), is an excellent example of a
court's uncertainty about the scope and use of quota relief. In evaluating district court quotas
for police hiring and promotion, the Third Circuit first rejected quotas for hiring and
promotion, 4 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1286 (3d Cir. 1972). On rehearing, however, the same
court again rejected promotional quotas, but affirmed the hiring procedures including the
quota provisions because the court was "equally divided" with respect to those provisions.
473 F.2d at 1030.
12. 452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir. 1972).
13. Id. at 330.
14. Commonwealth v. O'Neill, 4 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1286, 1289-90 (3d Cir. 1972).
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Despite these reservations, these courts refused to declare use of
quota systems impermissible."5 Finding no other means by which to
remedy past discrimination, numerous courts have upheld quotas,
though not always denominated as such. 6 Furthermore, while the
debate over the appropriateness of quotas continued, they were approved in the majority of cases where such relief was proposed.' 7
The rationale supporting preferential treatment, however, has
begun to receive ever closer scrutiny as employers seek to comply
with government affirmative action regulations and court orders
requiring increased employment opportunities for minorities. As the
number of challenges to such action has increased, courts have
shown greater concern about the effects of remedial employment
efforts upon whites. The result has been a marked increase in the
courts' reluctance to approve preferential treatment of minorities or
to impose quota remedies. This reluctance was clearly evidenced by
a spate of decisions in 1975 and 1976 on the question of reverse
discrimination." Several of these cases deserve closer scrutiny.
15. The Carter court eventually approved a hiring quota of one minority person for
every two non-minority persons. 452 F.2d at 331. The O'Neill court, while voiding the hiring
quota system presented because it was not "limited to requiring the Police Department to
hire from a pool of applicants of demonstrated qualifications," noted that their action "inno
way suggests that imposing a quota system is unconstitutional as a judicial remedy for
discrimination." 4 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 1289.
16. See, e.g., Patterson v. Newspaper Deliverers' Union, 514 F.2d 767 (2d Cir. 1975);
EEOC v. Detroit Edison Co., 515 F.2d 301 (6th Cir. 1975); Morrow v. Crisler, 491 F.2d 1053
(5th Cir. 1974); Boston Chapter, NAACP, Inc. v. Beecher, 504 F.2d 1017 (1st Cir. 1974);
United States v. Ironworkers, Local 86, 443 F.2d 544 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v. Central
Motor Lines, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 479 (W.D.N.C. 1970).
17. For an exhaustive history of preferential relief, see Slate, PreferentialRelief in Employment DiscriminationCases, 5 Loy. CI. L.J. 315 (1974). Numerous articles have been
written examining the ethical and theoretical as well as the practical bases for preferential
relief in employment discrimination cases. See, e.g., Posner, The DeFunis Case and the
Constitutionality of Preferential Treatment of Racial Minorities, 1974 Sup. CT. Rav.; Sape,
Use of Numerical Quotas to Achieve Integration in Employment, 16 WM. & MAi L. REv.

481 (1975); Note, Employment Discrimination: The Promotional Quotas as a Suspect
Remedy, 7 Rurr.-CAM. L.J. 506 (1976).
18. See, e.g., Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 535 F.2d 257 (4th Cir. 1976) (upholding
non-preferential elements of the district court's affirmative action order but reversing an
order that the employer combine seniority rosters at his two plants and "bump" white workers); Chance v. Board of Examiners, 534 F.2d 993 (2d Cir. 1976) (reversing a district court
ordered quota "excessing" plan for teachers because of its non-remedial, racially-based distortion of the seniority system); Kirkland v. N.Y. State Dept. of Correctional Serv., 520 F.2d
420 (2d Cir. 1975) (rejecting the use of hiring and promotional quotas for civil service jobs);
Flanagan v. President & Board of Georgetown College, 417 F. Supp. 377 (D.D.C. 1976)
(invalidated university policy of granting financial aid based in racial quotas but refused to
award damages to white plaintiff); Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 415 F. Supp.
761 (E.D. La. 1976) (rejected quota requirements in a collective bargaining agreement on the
grounds that only a court could sanction such measures and only upon a showing of past
discrimination); McAleer v.A.T. & T. Co., 416 F. Supp. 435 (D.D.C. 1976) (awarding dam-
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One of the most notable decisions partially denying quota relief
because of its effect upon white employees was Kirkland v. New
York Department of CorrectionalServices. 19 In Kirkland, two black
correctional officers brought suit to enjoin promotions based upon
an allegedly discriminatory promotional exam. The test was held to
be racially discriminatory and unlawful, a finding affirmed by the
court of appeals. The district court had, however, ordered the establishment of a rigid quota system for promotions. 0
The use of such quota relief, insofar as it established a permanent
quota requirement, was struck down by the Second Circuit. While
it recognized quotas to be an appropriate remedy in some instances,
the court refused to permit their use when there had been no showing of clear-cut patterns of long-continued and egregious racial discrimination2 ' and where the proposed quota system would have an
identifiable impact upon a small number of easily ascertained individuals.2 2 Yet the court sanctioned use of interim quotas as a justifiable remedy within the lower court's discretion where the impact of
such quotas on white workers would be limited.
Since the decision in Kirkland, a growing judicial reluctance to
grant preferences to minorities at the expense of white, male workers has become more apparent. In California, an action brought by
white firemen challenging the legality of the affirmative action plan
of the City of Berkeley was successful.2 4 In another instance, a disages to a male worker displaced by his employer's compliance with quota requirements of a
consent decree); Cramer v. Virginia Commonwealth Univ., 12 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1397
(E.D. Va. 1976) (invalidated voluntary university quota requirements, under which a male
professor was denied a position, holding that there was not even a rational relation to justify
disparate treatment based on sex); Hiatt v. City of Berkeley, 10 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 251
(Cal. Sup. Ct. 1975) (granted injunctions to white fire department applicants on the grounds
that the city's quota requirements were not justified by any history of past discrimination
and would prove unwieldy in the future).
19. 520 F.2d 420 (2d Cir. 1975).
20. The district court's order, as expressed by the court of appeals, was threefold. It
ordered that: (1) a lawful, non-discriminatory selection procedure be established; (2) one
out of every four interim appointments be filled by a minority, subject to court approval; and
(3) defendants continue to promote at least one black or Hispanic employee for each three
white employees until the percentage of minority sergeants equals the percentage of minority
correctional officers. 520 F.2d at 423.
21. Id. at 427.
22. Id. at 429.
23. Id. at 429-30.
24. Hiatt v. City of Berkeley, 10 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 251 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 1975). The City
of Berkeley evidently had no record of past discrimination. The written exams it used for
hiring and promotion were admittedly job related, and the city had a record of initiating
programs during the past ten years to interest minority persons in working for the city. In
view of that history, the California court found no justification for preferential affirmative
action and granted injunctions to the aggrieved white employees and applicants. Cf. Commonwealth of Pa. v. Flaherty, 11 Empl. Prac. Dec. 6599 (W.D. Pa. 1975) where a temporary
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trict court's order "bumping" incumbent white male employees as
a remedy for previous race and sex discrimination was overturned.
The appellate court refused to permit displacement of workers who

"have done no wrong. ''25
In a decision issued shortly before the Supreme Court decision .in
McDonald, a Virginia district court came to grips even more clearly
with the problem of promoting minority and female employees at
the cost of foreclosing qualified white males from these positions.
Without ruling on the validity of all preferential relief, the court in
5 considered whether
Cramer v. Virginia Commonwealth University"
an affirmative action plan can excuse "preferential" treatment or
benign discrimination in employment decision-making. Virginia
Commonwealth University had actively recruited women for faculty
positions to compensate for alleged past deficiencies in hiring. The
male plaintiff was denied either of two positions for which he was
undisputedly at least as well or better qualified than the two female
applicants hired. The male applicant claimed the practice of preferential hiring pursuant to the university's affirmative action program
2
resulted in unlawful reverse discrimination. 1
In defense, the university asserted that its policy of considering
qualified female candidates to the exclusion of qualified males was
not in violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment. It contended such a policy was rationally related to the
school's obligation to conform to federal and state affirmative action
requirements. Further, the university took the position that prohibitions against preferential hiring and quotas contained in Title VII
were overridden by the implied obligation under Executive Order
2
11246 to afford preferences to minorities. 1
The court recognized the inherent conflict between implementation of an affirmative action plan and completely neutral hiring
hiring quota was upheld despite the fact that the written exam was validly job related. The
test was the sole criterion for appointment to the municipal police department, and reliance
on it had resulted in a pattern of racial and sexual imbalance. See also United States v. City
of Chicago, 549 F.2d 415, 436-39 (7th Cir. 1977) where sex and racial quotas for policemen
and women were upheld where past discrimination had been shown.
25. Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 535 F.2d 257 (4th Cr. 1976). The challenged
district court order had required the employer to combine seniority rosters at his two plants.
White workers would have thereby been "bumped" by more senior minority workers from the
other plant. The Fourth Circuit found that remedy to be broader than Title VII contemplated
as it affected "innocent white workers and as monetary relief was adequate." Cf. Franks v.
Bowman Transp. Co. 424 U.S. 747 (1976) (where the Supreme Court ordered similarly broad
seniority relief despite the potential effect on displaced white workers).
26. 12 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1397 (E.D. Va. 1976).
27. Id. at 1399-1400.
28. Id. at 1400-03.
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practices. Holding that Title VII prohibits such preferences and that
Executive Order 11246 does not negate the prohibition against preferential treatment, the court argued against any use of race or sex
as a criterion in hiring.s Finding affirmative action practices which
afford preferential treatment to minorities and females to be unlawful, the court insisted that the very same injustices to which affirmative action programs were addressed would be forever perpetuated
if preferential treatment were given on the basis of race or sex."
This concern for the rights of the majority can be further demonstrated by court decisions refusing to permit an employer to voluntarily correct past discriminatory practices by seniority modification;31 refusing to allow a school to permit the layoff of school supervisory personnel on a basis other than seniority; 32 and, refusing to
permit voluntary quota hiring for a police department to correct the
impact of a discriminatory entrance examination. 33 On the other
hand, the use of quota remedies continues, and it seems that remedial relief having a definite adverse impact on the competitive rights
of whites is still within the authority of the courts. It is not clear,
however, as elaborated below, 35 that an employer who implements
29. Relying to some extent on Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), the Cramer
court stated:
[Wihether or not affirmative action is a good policy, the Court holds it to be bad
law insofar as it permits or requires sex discrimination in hiring. . . . There will
never be sex or racial peace until the idea of sex or racial discrimination is dead
and buried. The primary-the only-beneficiaries of affirmative action plans and
their siblings are the thousands of persons engaged in the civil rights business,
bureaucrats, lawyers, lobbyists and politicians. The persons who are suffering are
the ostensible objects of the plans' solicitude, and persons, such as plaintiff herein,
who get flattened by the civil rights steamroller.
12 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 1403-04.
30. Id. at 1404. "The only means of ridding the nation of invidious discrimination is to
tear it out . . . 'root and branch' . . . . Affirmative action only perpetuates it."
31. Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 415 F. Supp. 761 (E.D. La. 1976). The
employer Rnd union had negotiated a collective bargaining agreement which provided that
certain craft training openings be filled on a "one-white, one-black" basis. The purpose of
the provision was to achieve a racial balance similar to that in the community. However, the
district court held that such preferential practices were appropriate only if court-sanctioned
and only upon a showing of past discrimination. See discussion accompanying notes 79-85
infra. Contra Gerrman v. Kipp, 14 Empl. Prac. Dec. 4525 (W.D. Mo. 1977).
32. Chance v. Board of Examiners, 534 F.2d 993 (2d Cir. 1976). The Second Circuit
reversed a district court order which had provided for "excessing" of positions (removal by
abolition of the positions) by a racial preferential formula. The court said the non-remedial
distortion of the seniority system was the kind of reverse discrimination specifically proscribed by Congress. See Note, The Continuing Validity of Seniority Systems Under Title
VII: Sharing the Burden of Discrimination,8 Loy. Cm.L.J. 882 (1977).
33. Lige v. Town of Montclair, 134 N.J. Sup. 227, 340 A.2d 660 (1970).
34. See Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976).
35. See text accompanying notes 90-99 infra.
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any such remedial program will have any defense to the claims of
adversely affected incumbent employees and white applicants.
Although the history of employment cases addressing the rights
of whites is inconclusive, analysis reveals a significant shift in emphasis. The individual concern of white workers over the adverse
effects of preferential hiring and promotion practices is now given
judicial recognition.36 In contrast to an earlier almost singleminded
concern to integrate minorities and females into the work force,
there is now a countervailing concern-at least in the courts, if not
by federal and local administrative agencies-to ensure that such
efforts do not discriminate against the majority.3 7 However, the ultimate resolution of who should bear the burden for the past history
of segregated work forces has not yet been established.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court will have to resolve the issue of
when, if ever, preferential treatment of minorities in employment
may be proper. The Court has already expressed a willingness to
address this question in the area of school admissions. 8 It was in
McDonald, however, that the Supreme Court first focused its
attention on the availability of Title VII and section 1981 relief to
white plaintiffs.
MCDONALD V. SANTA FE TRAIL TRANSPORTATION CO.

Prior to the Court's decision in McDonald, Title VII and the civil
rights acts of the last century had been receiving widespread utilization and steady judicial expansion.3 9 The Court in McDonald took
36. See, e.g., cases cited at notes 12, 14, 19, 24, 25, and 26, supra.
37. Id.
38. In early 1977, the Court granted a petition for certiorari in Bakke v. Regents of the
University of California, 18 Cal. 3d 34, 132 Cal. Rptr. 680, 553 P.2d 1152 (1976), cert. granted,
97 S. Ct. 1098 (1977). Bakke involved a fourteenth amendment challenge by an unsuccessful
white applicant to a medical school's special admissions program for disadvantaged racial
minorities. The court ruled that the state is not relieved of its heavy burden of showing a
"compelling interest" by the mere fact that the classification in question discriminates in
favor of the minority. The California Supreme Court rejected assertions that the classification
was justified by the state's desire to provide minority members with minority member professionals. In view of the fact that plaintiff was indeed more qualified than some of the minority
admittees and because the school had not been shown to have discriminated against minorities in the past and had not shown that less drastic means could not achieve the same results,
the Bakke court affirmed the lower courts' invalidation of the special admission program and
granted Bakke an injunction ordering that he be admitted. 18 Cal. 3d at 64, 132 Cal. Rptr.
at 700, 553 P.2d at 1172. But see Alvey v. Downstate Medical Center, 39 N.Y.2d 326, 348
N.E.2d 537 (1976).
39. See generally Dent & Martin, Multiple Remedies for Employment Discrimination:
How Many Bites of the Apple?, 16 S. TEx. L.J. 57 (1974); Draper, A Historical Sketch of the
Major Labor Law Developments that Have Occurred as a Result of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 and the Activities of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 18 How. L.J. 29
(1973).
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the opportunity to express clearly that the antidiscrimination obligation of the federal civil rights laws protects whites and blacks
alike.
The underlying facts in McDonald were simple." In September,
1970, a black truck driver for Santa Fe Trail Transportation Company was observed loading cases of antifreeze into his car and was
apprehended. The driver claimed that he had purchased the antifreeze from another driver, McDonald, a white, and that it had been
approved by the dock foreman, a white man. Santa Fe investigated
the incident and discharged McDonald for dishonesty in the theft
of freight from company equipment and violation of company rules.
The dock foreman was discharged for failing to properly perform his
duties, exercising poor judgment, and violating company rules. The
driver originally apprehended, who appeared to Santa Fe to have
been uninvolved with the misappropriation, was not discharged.
McDonald, a member of Teamsters Local 988, filed a grievance
on the same day he was discharged. The discharge was upheld in
arbitration. He then filed a charge of racial discrimination with the
EEOC. McDonald and the dock foreman, following McDonald's
receipt of a "right-to-sue" letter from the EEOC, filed suit in the
Southern District of Texas invoking Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981.41
Plaintiffs alleged that all three employees had been jointly and
severally charged with misappropriation of company property and
that Santa Fe imposed more severe discipline against them because
of their Caucasian race. They also claimed the union acquiesced or
40. McDonald was decided on a Motion to Dismiss under FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The
Supreme Court accordingly took as true the well pleaded allegations of the complaint. 427
U.S. at 276. However, depositions have been taken of the major participants in this occurrence and the following recitation is derived from those depositions and from interrogatories
answered by the parties. We do not represent this recitation to be the facts as may be
ultimately proven in the district court on remand. Nor should this material be construed as
a comment upon any of the testimony which may be forthcoming at that trial.
41. It should be noted that several underlying jurisdictional issues were left unresolved.
It was never alleged that the dock foreman had filed a charge with the EEOC. The district
court did deny McDonald's attempt to maintain his action as a class action, but nevertheless
retained jurisdiction over the foreman's individual claim.
Additionally, since McDonald was discharged on October 2, 1969, and did not file his
charge with the EEOC until April of 1971, it is evident that he did not file within 90 days of
his discharge as required by Title VII. This situation raises yet unanswered questions as to
whether the 90 day period was tolled pending resolution of the grievance and, since the
arbitration process was completed by October 29, 1970, whether he had received notice of the
result of that proceeding and when. The issue of tolling during pendency of grievance
procedures had not been resolved at the time of trial. Subsequently, the Court in International Union of Elec. Workers v. Robbins & Myers, 97 S.Ct. 441 (1976) held that filing a
grievance under a collective bargaining agreement does not toll the limitation period. This
may dispose of McDonald on remand.
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joined in this discrimination and failed to protect the whites in
violation of its duties of fair representation.
After three and one-half years of pretrial activity,42 the district
court terminated the action. Judge Bue dismissed the section 1981
allegation for lack of jurisdiction, ruling that it was inapplicable to
whites.4" The Title VII allegation was dismissed as against the union
for lack of jurisdiction since the union was not named in the charge
filed with the EEOC.44 As against Santa Fe, it was dismissed for
failure of the plaintiff to allege that the charge of misappropriation
was false. 5
The Fifth Circuit in a per curiam opinion affirmed, ruling that
section 1981 confers no actionable rights upon white persons and
that no Title VII claim was stated in the absence of an allegation
that the employer's accusation of theft was false.4" It implicitly distinguished McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green 7 by noting this was
not a case of discipline for an offense not constituting a crime.4"
On certiorari, petitioners argued that they must be provided an
opportunity to show that the charge of misappropriation was merely
a pretext for discriminatory discipline. With respect to white persons' standing under section 1981, petitioners pointed out that the
statute refers to "all persons" and cited legislative history and some
lower court decisions supporting their position. They emphasized
42. Pretrial activity included three complaints, an exchange of interrogatory answers and
several depositions, as well as briefs by the two parties and two memorandum opinions.
43. "Upon full consideration of the pleadings and authorities cited, it is the opinion of
the Court that the better reasoned authorities hold that § 1981 is inapplicable to white
persons." 10 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1162, 1163 (S.D. Tex. 1974).
44. Id. at 1164.
45. The court stated:
The pleadings of the plaintiffs do not allege that they were falsely charged with
misappropriating company property; the substance of the allegations is that plaintiffs take issue with the fact that they were discharged for such conduct while a
similarly charged Negro employee was not discharged. Upon reconsideration, the
Court concluded that the dismissal of white employees charged with misappropriating company property while not dismissing a similarly charged Negro employee
does not raise a claim upon which Title VII relief may be granted.
Id. at 1165.
46. 513 F.2d 90 (5th Cir. 1975).
47. 411 U.S. 792 (1973). The plaintiff in McDonnell Douglas was a black employee who
had engaged in an organized "stall-in" and "lock-in" to protest his allegedly discriminatory
layoff. The employer subsequently advertised for workers with plaintiff's qualifications, but
rejected plaintiffs application for re-employment. The Supreme Court concluded that, although the employer was not compelled to rehire an employee who had engaged in such
conduct, he was compelled to apply his standards alike to persons of all races. In addition,
the employer could not use the employee's conduct as a pretext for discrimination.
48. This attempted distinction was rejected by the Supreme Court, which found
McDonnell Douglas "indistinguishable." 427 U.S. at 281-82.
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that a favorable decision would not imperil the appropriate application of affirmative action programs because there was no indication
that Santa Fe's action in this case had any reference to an effort to
remedy past discrimination."'
Santa Fe's position was that white thieves are not protected by
Title VII, and pointed to the McDonnell Douglas requirement for
establishing a prima facie case of discrimination that the plaintiff
be qualified for the position he was denied 0 Santa Fe also urged
that strict racial neutrality, in any event, is not consistent with the
policy of affirmative action and would undermine the purpose of the
civil rights acts." The union contended that it could not properly
perform its duty as an employee representative if it must seek to
have all "guilty" employees fired, or none."
Both respondents urged that section 1981 conferred no standing
to whites.5 The employer further asserted that petitioners did not
state a claim upon which relief could be granted because white
persons should be required to allege some pattern of class-type discrimination against whites. Without this additional requirement, it
was reasoned, employers would be subjected to numerous frivolous
lawsuits brought by disgruntled white employees.5
The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Mr. Justice Marshall, ruled
with respect to the Title VII issue that McDonnell Douglas controlled, and reversed the decision of the lower court. 5 It held that
an employer must apply discipline equally without regard to race,
even to thieves, and addressed the union's concern by stating that
a bargaining representative must not allow racial discrimination to
enter into its otherwise legitimate compromise function." The Court
also found that the language of section 1981 and the greater weight
49. Brief for Petitioners McDonald and Laird, at 12, McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp.
Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976).
50. Brief for Respondent Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., at 15-16, McDonald v. Santa Fe
Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976) [hereinafter Santa Fe Brief].
51. Id. at 15-21.
52. Brief for Respondent Local No. 988, Teamsters Freight, Tank Line & Automobile
Industry Employees, at 10-12, McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976)
[hereinafter Local 988 Brief].
53. Santa Fe Brief, supra note 50, at 23-30; Local 988 Brief, supra note 52, at 12-40.
54. Santa Fe Brief, supra note 50, at 30-32. The Court also permitted filing of amicus
briefs by the Department of Justice, the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, the American Jewish Committee and the Chamber of Commerce of the United States. The thrust of
these briefs was that whites should enjoy the same protection from racial discrimination as
any minority group. The NAACP was also allowed to file a brief as amicus in which it
contended that summary judgment was appropriate since there was no genuine factual issue
that the discharges were pretexts for racial discrimination.
55. 427 U.S. at 281-282.
56. Id. at 285.
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of its legislative history mandated a finding that white persons have
standing to invoke that provision. 7 It is important to remember,
however, that the Court expressly refrained from commenting on
whether whites could challenge employment decisions undertaken
pursuant to an affirmative action obligation.5 8
Although provoking popular discussion at the time, McDonald v.
Santa Fe is not a revolutionary case in the law of employment
discrimination. It had been widely assumed that white, anglosaxon, protestant males were protected by Title VII. Section 1981,
in its practical effect, "expands" those rights only by allowing circumvention of the administrative procedures and time constraints
imposed by Title VII.55 Rather, the importance of McDonald is that
it provides high Court recognition of the concept of "reverse discrimination." McDonald merely demonstrates that individual
members of the majority have the same right to nondiscrimination
as minorities.
During the last decade, an important social policy to abolish the
effects of past discrimination and integrate the nation's work force
was recognized and energetically pursued. Executive Order 1124660
and various other regulations 1 require recipients of federal funds to
take affirmative action to enhance employment opportunities for
minorities." At the same time, Congress passed Title VII,63
prohibiting discrimination in employment, and established the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to enforce that obligation. 4 That agency, as well as other federal, state, and local agen57. Id. at 286-87, 295-96.
58. Id. at 281 n.8. Santa Fe disclaimed that the actions challenged were part of an affirmative action program. Sante Fe Brief, supra note 50, at 19 n. 5, and we emphasize that we do
not consider here the permissibility of such a program, whether judicially required or otherwise prompted. The Supreme Court also emphasized that it was not considering the permissibility of a similar affirmative action program, whether voluntary or judicially mandated. 427
U.S. at 281 n.8. For a discussion of how McDonald, read in the light of the legislative and
judicial history of Title VII, may affect employers' willingness to enter into affirmative action
programs, see Note, The Employer's Dilemma: Quotas, Reverse Discrimination,and Voluntary Compliance, 8 Loy. Cm. L.J. 369 (1976).
59. Section 706 of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (Supp. II 1972), amending 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-5 (1970), in general establishes a 180 day statute of limitation for filing claims. Suit
may not be filed until the completion of Commission handling or six months from the date
of charge, and must be filed within 90 days of receipt of notice of right to sue. Suits under
Section 1981 are not subject to such administrative constraints.
60. Exec. Order No. 11246 (1965), codified in 3 C.F.R. § 169 (1974).
61. See, e.g., 41 C.F.R. Parts 60-1 through 60-74 (1976).
62. See text accompanying notes 64-69 infra for a discussion of the interplay between
Executive Order 11246 and the regulations of the Office of Federal Contract Compliance.
63. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000-e to e-15 (1970), as
amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-17 (Supp. IV 1974).
64. Id.
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cies, together with various citizens' groups and individuals, have
brought constant pressure to bear on employers to improve their
"minority profile." McDonald and other recent cases reflect a growing awareness that efforts to equalize the interests of minorities may
operate at the expense of the majority."
This emerging concern for the rights of whites belatedly brings
into focus the practical difficulties of implementing a national policy affirmatively to integrate minorities into the work force and yet
simultaneously to assure equal employment opportunity to all. Perhaps the primary roadblock to rapid employment integration is the
effect on incumbent employees of attempts to put minorities into
their "rightful place." Ironically, during the same term it heard
McDonald, the Supreme Court decided in Franks v. Bowman
TransportationCo.,"5 that victims of past racial discrimination were
presumptively entitled to a retroactive seniority date despite the
corresponding loss of "competitive-type" benefits by innocent incumbent employees. It is only a matter of time until a displaced
incumbent employee presents the Court with his claim against the
employer, citing McDonald.67
In theory, it may be possible to achieve parity between relevant
racial populations and job holders of every category, and to attain
this goal without ever discriminating against anyone. The inescapable fact, however, is that an employer with disparate racial patterns,
presumably the result of past discrimination cannot, without reverse discrimination, alleviate that condition quickly. Under the
most ideal conditions-i.e., an unlimited pool of qualified minority
labor willing and available to accept employment and a statistically
perfect source of applications-if all employment decisions after
1964 were made without regard to race, it would take at least a full
generation of the work force, twenty-five to forty years, before all
present effects of past discrimination could be eliminated. Obviously, it requires a complete turnover in the existing, racially imbalanced work force to replace it with a force selected without discrimination.
Affirmative action is plainly designed to reduce this delay. Employers constantly face pressure-real pressure involving dollars
65. See notes 12-35 and accompanying text.
66. 424 U.S. 747 (1976).
67. To date, the only case in which a court has upheld an incumbent employee's right to
damages for reverse discrimination in promotion is McAleer v. A.T. & T., 416 F. Supp. 435
(D.D.C. 1976). The decision was reached two weeks before McDonald was decided; however,
the case was settled after judgment in September of 1976, rendering its precedential value
minimal. For a more extensive treatment of McAleer, see text accompanying notes 93-109
infra.
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and cents-from government agencies, private litigants, and the
courts to reach population parity, now. Government contractors
must annually submit affirmative action plans specifying their minority hiring "goals," and comparing past goals and actual performanceA5 Poor performance may lead to a compliance review"9 resulting in loss of the contract, 0 or even back pay liability.7 So long as
the employer has not reached parity, he knows that he faces a prima
facie case of discrimination under the civil rights statutes7" and
therefore the potential for a suit difficult to defend. Victims of this
apparent discrimination are encouraged to bring class actions for
back pay and recovery of attorneys' fees, thus wielding the club of
heavy litigation costs. But to the extent that any employer expends
greater effort to hire and promote minorities, he may be guilty of
reverse discrimination."
McDonald and kindred cases are making it clear that the easy
solution of reverse discrimination is not available to ease the burden
of civil rights obligations; that employers must walk the tightrope
of nondiscrimination without favoring any group. But the fact remains that many, if not most, employers still face a work force in
which minorities are under-represented, especially with respect to
management, skilled and professional positions. Consequently these
employers face the continuing threat of litigation and loss of large
federal contracts. Counsel for management will recognize the now
familiar inquiry from exasperated personnel officers-what do I do
now? What steps can an employer take to avoid liability for the
present effects of past discrimination? Unfortunately, the answer is
not satisfying. The trend in the case law indicates that he cannot
safely take voluntary action and especially may not institute a
68. See OFCC Revised Order No. 4, C.F.R. Part 60-2.
69. See OFCC Revised Order No. 14, C.F.R. Part 60-60.
70. See Exec. Order No. 11246 (1965), codified in 3 C.F.R. § 169 (1974).
71. It has recently been held that the federal government can recover in restitution back
pay on behalf of aggrieved employees pursuant to Exec. Order No. 11246. United States v.
Duquesne Light Co., 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1608 (W.D. Pa. 1976). It has also been reported
that in addition to bringing suit under Title VII, employees of one company by suing the
federal government for failure to enforce Exec. Order No. 11246 have assured government
efforts to obtain back pay without awaiting the results of the Title VII action. FEP Summary
of Developments, No. 308, December 9, 1976. See generally, Rose, Judicial Enforcement of
Executive Order 11246 and Remedies Thereunder, in PROCEEDnNS OF THE SECOND ABA NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY LAw 25 (1975).
72. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973); Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421 (8th Cir. 1970).
73. For a discussion of the use and availability of class actions in Title VII cases, see
Meyers, Title VII Class Actions: Promises and Pitfalls, 8 LoY. CHI. L.J. 767 (1977).
74. See text accompanying notes 90-99 infra
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quota hiring and advancement system.7 5 Apparently, the employer
must wait until he is sued as the federal courts allow only themselves to discriminate. Even then, if the court and litigants reach
some solution, voluntary or otherwise, the employer still faces an
unquantifiable exposure to lawsuits by adversely affected whites. 6
These results are unacceptable, for they nullify any incentive to act
voluntarily and thrust upon the courts the entire burden of rectifying the effects of past discrimination in employment.
VOLUNTARY MEASURES DISCOURAGED

One aim of Title VII is to encourage private integration of minorities into the nation's work force. The Supreme Court emphasized
this function when it observed in Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody7
that:
[Tihe reasonably certain prospect of a back pay award provides
the spur and catalyst for employers and unions to self-examine and
self-evaluate their employment practices and eliminate so far as
possible the last vestiges of an unfortunate and ignominious page
in this country's history."8
That Court has also described the voluntary modification by employers and unions of seniority systems to ameliorate the effects of
past discrimination as a method useful to establish a balanced work
force, "a national policy objective of the 'highest priority.'"" However, the McDonald decision, along with several recent lower court
opinions, has significantly undermined employers' desire to take
such voluntary remedial efforts. Whether an employer and a union
can agree, without exposing themselves to further litigation, to implement any plan which would benefit minorities more than white
males is now open to speculation.
The recent case of Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical
Corp.80 clearly indicates the kind of trouble an employer and union
can create by attempting to improve their minority profile. Kaiser
and the United States Workers entered into a bargaining agreement
containing a special provision designed to increase the number of
75. See notes 77-89 infra and accompanying text.
76. See the discussion of McAleer v. American Tel. & Tel., 416 F. Supp. 435 (D.D.C.
1976), at text accompanying notes 90-99 infra.
77. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
78. Id. at 417-18. The Supreme Court in Albemarle allowed back pay on a class basis
despite a lack of employer bad faith. Citing the compensatory "make whole" purpose of Title
VII, the Court set the stage for extensive back pay awards in later employment discrimination
cases.
79. Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 779 (1976).
80. 415 F. Supp. 761 (E.D. La. 1976).
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minority employees at a Louisiana plant. Although the plant had
adhered to a policy of nondiscrimination since 1958 and, after 1969,
had hired new employees on a "one white, one black" basis, in 1974
minorities still represented only fifteen percent of the plant employees and two to two and one-half percent of skilled craft employees
while comprising approximately forty percent of the work force in
that area. 8 Kaiser first attempted without success to identify and
recruit qualified black craftsmen. Kaiser and the steel workers then
agreed to adjust the prior procedure for assigning apprenticeship
and craft job openings from a simple question of seniority to the
"one white, one black" basis, each new opening going to the person
with highest racial seniority. The plaintiffs were passed over for
craft openings in favor of less-senior blacks-blacks who had not
been judicially determined to be victims of prior discrimination.
The district court enjoined the employer and union from pursuing
this agreement. 2
The court was unimpressed by the defendants' motivation for the
quota system, implying that a desire to comply with the Office of
Federal Contract Compliance (OFCC) regulations and to avoid vexatious litigation is an unworthy predicate to reverse discrimination." The court also noted that Title VII prohibits all racial discrimination and ruled that section 703(j) not only bars quota requirements, but positively forbids voluntary quotas:
It is clear that the Congress was aware of the concept of affirmative
action programs during its considerations, and that it did not
choose to exempt what many consider the salutary or benign discrimination of such programs from its sweeping prohibitions
against racial discrimination by an employer against any individual.'
81. Id. at 764.
82. Id. at 770.
83. "There is no evidence that Kaiser, in incorporating this quota system in the 1974
Labor Agreement, did so with a view toward correcting the effects of prior discrimination at
any of the fifteen plants to which the system had application. To the contrary, it appears
that satisfying the requirements of OFCC, and avoiding vexatious litigation by minority
employees, were its prime motivations." 415 F. Supp. at 765.
84. Id. at 766. Such a reading places little strain on the legislative history of § 703(j). The
sponsor of an amendment which eventually became §703(j) stated that the amendment would
clearly prohibit the imposition of any quota system under Title VII. 110 CONG. REc. 9881,
9882 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Allot). Similarly, Senator Clark expressly declared this to be
the case:
[Any deliberate attempt to maintain a given [racial or ethnic] balance would
almost certainly run afoul of Title VII because it would involve a failure or refusal
to hire some individual because of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
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The court went on to reject the defendants' argument that their
quota system had the same effect as court orders frequently approved in civil rights actions requiring percentage hiring of minorities. The court admitted there was an apparent inconsistency between the. prohibition of employer-created affirmative action programs and court-fashioned affirmative relief. However, the court
emphasized the substantial differences between the two approaches.
The most important and obvious distinction is the fact that
Sections 703(a) and (d) of Title VII do not prohibit the courts from
discriminating against individual employees by establishing quota
systems where appropriate. The proscriptions of the statute are
directed solely to employers.
There are other logical and compelling reasons for distinction
between employer action and court action. First, because relief of
this nature should be imposed with extreme caution and discretion, and only in those limited cases where necessary to cure the
ill effects of past discrimination, the courts alone are in a position
to afford due process to all concerned in determining the necessity
for and in fashioning such relief. Further, the administration of
such relief by the courts tends to assure that those remedial programs will be uniform in nature and will exist only as long as
necessary to effectuate the purposes of the Civil Rights Act.,

The court acknowledged it was invalidating a kind of affirmative
effort urged by the OFCC and used by employers in the past, but
maintained that Title VII required the result. Any change should
come from Congress. 6
What Title VII seeks to accomplish, what the civil rights bill seeks to accomplish,
is equal treatment for all.
110 CONG. REc. 7207 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Clark). Likewise, Senator Williams stated,
"Those who say equality means favoritism do violence to common sense." 110 CONG. REC.
8921 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Williams).
85. Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 415 F. Supp. 761, 767-68 (E.D. La. 1976).
86. In reaching its conclusion that the discriminatory provisions of Kaiser's
affirmative action program violate specific proscriptions of Title VII of the 1964
Civil Rights Act, the Court is well aware that similar programs have been adopted,
before and after enactment of the 1964 Act, by many employers in the private and
public sector, often because of pressure from various agencies of the Executive
Branch of the United States Government. Undoubtedly, the laudable objective of
promoting job opportunities in our society for members of minority groups has been
viewed as a justification for the discrimination against other individuals which
almost certainly results from such programs. Prior to the effective date of the 1964
Civil Rights Act, employers may have been free, for whatever motivation, to engage
in such discriminatory employment practices. Indeed, it well may be that employers should be permitted to discriminate in an otherwise illegal fashion in order to
bring about a national social goal. This Court, however, is not sufficiently skilled
in the art of sophistry to justify such discrimination by employers in light of the
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The Weber case casts a pall on any voluntary effort by unions and
employers to achieve population parity and reduce their exposure
to troublesome federal agency inquiry and private litigation. While
the decision represents only one district judge's opinion, and an
earlier decision in Tennessee is directly to the contrary, 7 it is consistent with the growing trend of cases subjecting preferential policies
to close scrutiny.8 The emerging concern for the rights of whites
signaled in McDonald, coupled with the Weber decision and others
that have upheld white actions for discriminatory employment policies"' has led counsel for employers to inject a large measure of
caution into any discussion of employment policies designed to increase minority participation.
JUDICIALLY IMPOSED PROGRAMS MAY

NOT BE SAFE

If voluntary compliance programs will not be honored by the
courts, the employer with a statistical disparity in his work force
must wait to be sued. Many employers who today pursue a totally
nondiscriminatory hiring policy are acutely aware that their past
practices resulted in racial disparity. For these employers, minority
under-representation is a powder keg awaiting the match. Any action to ease the statistical imbalance may disadvantage majority
employees or applicants. Consequently, federal compliance proceedings or litigation which would generally resolve the discrimination issue for an entire craft, is not always unwelcome. In many such
cases, the employer and the EEOC have been able to agree on an
appropriate accommodation of interests. As a result, a complaint
unequivocal prohibitions against racial discrimination against any individual contained in Sections 703(a) and (d) of the 1964 Act.
Moreover, if such racial discrimination by employers against individuals is to be
sanctioned as a benign exception to the prohibitions of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act, then it is the opinion of this Court that such exception should be enacted by
the Congress, that branch of our government responsible for creation of the national
policy reflected in the prohibitions of Title VII, and not by a life tenured member
of the Federal Judiciary.
415 F. Supp. at 769-70.
87. Barnett v. International Harvester, 12 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 786 (W.D. Tenn. 1976).
The employer and union were granted summary judgment in a Title VII action directed at
an apprenticeship program in which applicants were listed by aptitude on separate eligibility
lists for whites and blacks. Positions were filled by alternately accepting the top applicant
from each list. The court found such an arrangement, which resulted in blacks with lower
aptitude test results being placed ahead of whites with higher results, did not violate Title
VII or 42 U.S.C. §1981. It is interesting to note that the employer filed a cross-claim against
the OFCC which had approved the program. Since the court found no discrimination, it did
not have to face the novel question of the agency's liability for reverse discrimination.
88. See notes 12-35 supra and accompanying text.
89. See, e.g., Hollander v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 392 F. Supp. 90 (D. Conn. 1975).
90. To our perhaps jaundiced view, the wait is not likely to be a long one.
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and consent order are often filed simultaneously.' Such a procedure, of course, comports with the preferred scheme of conference
and conciliation established in Title VII11
This type of compromise, however, had been premised upon the
assumption that whatever the outcome of the litigation the court's
order would relieve the employer from further concern over possible
exposure for past discrimination. Particularly, it was thought that
if a court ordered preferential hiring, goals, quotas or other affirmative relief, incumbent employees would not be able to challenge the
result. Recent decisional law, however, has cast serious doubt on
that assumption.
A case causing considerable consternation among employers is
McAleer v. American Telephone and Telegraph Co."3 In that case
Judge Gesell of the District Court for the District of Columbia approved an award of damages to a white male employee who had
been passed over for a promotion. The plaintiff concededly was
entitled to the promotion under the effective collective bargaining
agreement but, pursuant to a prior consent decree, the position was
instead given to a less qualified and less senior female solely because
of her sex. The decree, negotiated between AT&T and the EEOC
under the auspices of the district court of Philadelphia 4 provided
an "affirmative action override" to the bargaining agreement. The
agreement had specified that if two applicants for a position have
substantially equivalent qualifications, the position must be offered
to the one with superior seniority. If stated employment goals were
not met, however, the decree required that as between persons
possessing basic qualifications, the employer must choose the minority or female person. 5
Judge Gesell interpreted the policy of Title VII to place the burden of past discrimination on the guilty employer (or union) and
wherever possible to relieve the innocent incumbent employee." He
91. This method of resolving the dispute is generally applauded, and has been characterized as the congressionally "preferred means." Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S.
36, 44 (1974).
92. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1970).
93. 416 F. Supp. 435 (D.D.C. 1976).
94. FAm EMPL. PRAc. MAN. (BNA) § 431:73-123 (E.D. Pa. 1973), as supplemented, EEOC
v. A.T. & T. Co., 93 DAILY LAB. RP. (BNA) D-1 (E.D.Pa. 1975) [hereinafter cited as A.T. &
T. Consent Decree].
95. F~m EMPL. PR.c. MAN. (BNA) § 431:117.
96. Relying on the Supreme Court's opinion in Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., Inc., 424
U.S. 747 (1976), and especially Chief Justice Burger's separate opinion in that case, Id. at
777, Judge Gesell stated:
courts should attempt to protect innocent employees by placing this burden [that
of eradicating the effects of past discrimination] on the wrongdoing employer
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rejected the traditional defense that AT&T's acts were required by
court order reasoning that the order was necessitated by AT&T's
own wrongful conduct and thus not protected. 7 Although the employer must continue to comply with the court order, he must also
compensate those majority employees affected by the preferential
plan. The McAleer court recognized that competitive status job
benefits such as promotion, transfer, and order of layoff and recall
may be withheld from incumbent employees but required the employer to pay for the loss of those benefits. Thus, the employer is
liable for back pay to minorities and front pay to incumbents."
The McAleer case has been settled out of court and in the absence
of further appellate review its validity is subject to question." In
fact, another judge has considered and refused to follow McAleer."'
There is some authority indicating that employment decisions
taken pursuant to a court order even in this context should be
immune from collateral attacks. 01 Nonetheless, Judge Gesell relied
upon the opinions in the recent Supreme Court decision in Franks
2 and his reasoning is not
v. Bowman TransportationCo."0
inconsistent with that decision.
In Franks,black applicants for over-the-road positions brought an
action against Bowman Transportation for Title VII violations. The
district court found that their rejection had been based upon racial
discrimination, but it refused to grant retroactive seniority to the
whenever possible. . . . This Court, agreeing with these sentiments, sees no reason
why in equitably distributing the burden among the concerned parties the onus
should be shifted from the employer responsible for the discrimination to the
blameless third-party employee any more than is, as a practical matter, unavoidable.
416 F. Supp. at 439-40.
97. 416 F. Supp. at 440.
98. This effect was expressly presaged in Franks. See the opinion of the Court, 424 U.S.
at 777 n.38, and the separate opinion of Chief Justice Burger, 427 U.S. at 780.
99. It is possible that the appeal pending from the district court decision in EEOC v. A.T.
& T. Co., 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 392 (E.D. Pa. 1976) will shed some light on the appropriateness of the A.T. & T. consent decree. At the district court level, Judge Higganbotham,
who originally entered the consent decree, upheld it against challenges based on Title VII,
the Natonal Labor Relations Act, Executive Order 11246 and the Constitution.
100. Judge Higgenbotham remarks of the McAleer decision:
With all due respect to Judge Gesell, I believe that case to be wrongly decided. Title
VII recognizes a narrow but nevertheless real and complete immunity for employer
conduct undertaken in good faith reliance on a written interpretation or opinion of
the EEOC. The Consent Decree and its accompanying documents in the instant
case certainly constitute such an interpretation or opinion. [citations omitted].
EEOC v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 390, 418 n.34 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
101. See, e.g., Black and White Children of Pontiac School Sys. v. School Dist. of Pontiac,
464 F.2d 1030 (6th Cir. 1972); O'Burn v. Shapp, 70 F.R.D. 1029 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
102. 424 U.S. 747 (1976).
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date of their application.'13 The Supreme Court reversed that aspect
of the case, ruling that an award of retroactive seniority, like back
pay, is presumptively necessary to make whole the victims of past
racial discrimination. 14 Such seniority status serves to place these
victims in their "rightful place." In response to a dissent by Justices
Powell and Rehnquist, the majority reasoned that any adverse affect upon innocent, incumbent employees simply must be tolerated
to achieve racial justice." 5 In support, the Court noted that regardless of this relief the discriminatee continues to bear some of the
burden of past discrimination.' The Court was careful to point out
further possible remedial action: a "hold harmless" order respecting
all affected employees in a layoff, front pay in favor of each employee, and union liability where it participated in the illegal conduct. However, the Court expressly refrained from ruling on these
issues. 0 71 The Chief Justice, concurring and dissenting in part,
stressed that a more equitable remedy would be to provide front pay
to the affected innocent employees and reiterated that such claims
were not foreclosed by the Court's opinion. 0 8
The Franksopinion can fairly be read as an invitation to consider
front pay liability to innocent incumbent employees. In McAleer,
the court accepted that invitation. Judge Gesell held that McAleer
was entitled to the benefits of the seniority position he held immediately prior to remedial efforts. Consequently, after the remedy is
invoked and the minority plaintiff is awarded the position, the employer is still required to provide the benefits of that position to the
affected "innocent" majority employee. In sum, two different employees have valid claims to the benefits of the same position.'00 The
effect on the employer is apparent: having once discriminated in the
past, he is potentially liable for two salaries for the same position
until the incumbent retires.
103. Id. at 751.
104. Id. at 766.
105. The majority concluded that nothing in Title VII barred the proposed relief, and that
the conflicting interests at bar would be present among employees any time "scarce" employment benefits were contingent on seniority. In addition, the court found, on balance, that
"[i]f relief under Title VII can be denied merely because the majority group of employees,
who have not suffered discrimination, will be unhappy about it, there will be little hope of
correcting the wrongs to which the Act was directed." 424 U.S. 774-75.
106. Id. at 776.
107. Id. at 777.
108. Id. at 780-81.
109. The same dual liability results if the court prohibits displacement of incumbent
employees and instead orders front and back pay to minorities, an unlikely remedy after
Franks. See Patterson v. Am. Tobacco Co., 12 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 314 (4th Cir. 1976).

19771

Remedies for Past Discrimination
IMPLICATIONS

The lower court cases discussed above cannot be considered the
final word in the fluid and still developing law of employment practices and they can not be attributed to the Supreme Court decision
in McDonald. They share with McDonald, however, the reflection
of an increased awareness that white employees enjoy the same
rights to nondiscrimination as those enjoyed by minorities. This
awareness has, in turn, significantly affected the responses by employers and labor organizations to pressures for minority hiring and
advancement.
The real significance of this development lies in its impact on
efforts to take "affirmative action" to integrate minorities into the
work force. Many employers are still confronted with disproportionate work force populations, especially in skilled, professional
and management positions. The OFCC, EEOC and numerous civic
groups-to say nothing of individual victims-are pressing for
changes in that minority profile."' Many employers want to achieve
the same result. However, the courts are increasingly avoiding imposition of quotas"' and it now appears that voluntary efforts which
make opportunities disproportionately available to minorities may
constitute unlawful reverse discrimination."'
If voluntary corrective action is unlawful, the courts will be the
only forum to decide what efforts, if any, will be made to correct the
minority work force of any given employer. But is the courtroom
really the place to implement a "national policy objective of the
highest priority? ' "

3

Should the lingering vestiges of centuries of

discrimination be resolved on a case-by-case basis? Exclusive judicial implementation of this policy would obviously take a very long
time and defeat the congressional mandate encouraging voluntary
solutions.
A further difficulty has been pointed out above: the judicial imprimatur may not settle the situation. It now seems possible that
two employees can obtain the benefits of the same "rightful place."
This establishes the measure of liability for a single unlawful
employment decision as the wage and benefit expense for the incumbent for the rest of his working life. Such draconian sums are
inappropriate and completely eliminate any motivation to rectify
the effects of past employment practices.
110.
111.
112.
113.

See text accompanying notes 64-69 supra.
See cases cited at notes 12, 14, 19, 24, and 26 supra.
Id.
Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 779 (1976).
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A final question which emerges from these cases is the continuing
effect of Executive Order 11246."1 The policy of the Order's administrator has clearly been to encourage efforts of minority hiring and
advancement."' As late as several years ago, that policy won wide
and enthusiastic support. Now, however, the inconsistency between
strict racial neutrality and affirmative action-in its literal sensehas become apparent. Any program, even if mandated by the
OFCC, which requires an employer to provide greater opportunity
to one group or another is likely to be invalid under the federal
civil rights statutes.
CONCLUSION

We have for some years recognized two national policies, one to
increase minority representation in employment, the other to eliminate discrimination. McDonald and other cases reflect an awareness
that these goals are inconsistent. Until this conflict is resolved, employers are left without guidance, subject to competing demands
which can carry extreme consequences. It is time to resolve the role
of affirmative action in employment so employers and unions can
voluntarily institute the practices necessary and proper without the
constant burden of vexatious administrative lawsuits and without
the constant oversight of the judiciary.
114.
115.

3 C.F.R. § 169 (1974).
See 41 C.F.R. §§ 60-2.1 to 60-2.26 (1976).
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